We consider two-person undiscounted repeated games with lack of information on one side and state-independent signalling and prove the existence of a "joint plan" uniform equilibrium.
1. Introduction. Repeated games with two players and lack of information on one side were introduced by Aumann and Maschler in 1968 (see Aumann and Maschler 1995) . In this model, a state of nature is ÿrst chosen according to a known probability and is only announced to one of the players, the informed player. The state of nature determines a pair of payo matrices, and the game with the corresponding payo s is repeated. Assuming that the repetition is inÿnite and players are inÿnitely patient, the question of the existence of uniform equilibrium in the full monitoring case (i.e., the players observe, after each stage, the actions just chosen), has been posed by Aumann et al. (1995) and has been studied greatly since then, in particular by Sorin (1983) and Hart (1985) . Recently, Simon et al. (1995) succeeded in proving, by using a generalization of Sorin's approach, the existence of such an equilibrium.
Here we generalize this existence result to the case in which the players no longer observe after each move what their opponent has played but receive a private random signal, assumed to be independent of the state. Note that, in this case, the informed player may not know at every stage everything known by the other player (and particularly the other player's a posteriori probability over the states of nature).
The model studied here clearly encompasses two aspects of repeated games, incomplete information and imperfect monitoring. The proof uses techniques developed by Lehrer (1990 Lehrer ( , 1992 for games with complete information and imperfect monitoring and the work of Simon et al. (1995) for the full monitoring case. However, the equilibrium strategies we construct di er from those in Simon et al. and provide a new kind of equilibrium for the full monitoring case. An important point to be made is that the informed player never uses past observations, which is related to the results known for the zero-sum case: The observation of the informed player plays no role in the expression of the value of the repeated game (see Aumann and Maschler 1995) and in construction of optimal strategies (see Kohlberg 1975) .
The model and the results are presented in §2. In §3, we deÿne some conditions on generalized joint plans. The existence of such plans is proved in §4, and §5 shows that given such plans, one can construct a uniform equilibrium. Finally, concluding remarks deal with di erent models of repeated games with incomplete information.
2. The model. If S is a ÿnite set, |S| will denote its cardinal and (S), the set of probability distributions over S. For p in (S), Supp p will denote the support of p.
A two-person repeated game with lack of information on one side and state-independent signalling, denoted by ∞ (p 0 ), is given by the following data: • Two players, namely, player 1 (the informed player) and player 2 (the uninformed player), • Finite sets: K = {1; : : : ; |K|} (set of states), I and J (sets of actions), and U and V (sets of signals), • A (initial) probability p 0 on K, • For each k in K, |I | × |J | payo matrices A k and B k , • A signalling |I | × |J | matrix Q with entries in (U × V ). The play of the inÿnitely repeated game is as follows:
• At stage 0, k ∈ K is selected according to p 0 and told to player 1.
• At each stage n = 1; 2; : : : ; the players independently choose an action in their own set of actions. When-n ∈ I and-n ∈ J are selected by players 1 and 2, respectively, an element (u n ; v n ) ∈ U × V is chosen according to Q-n ;-n ; the stage payo s are then A k -n;-n for player 1 and B k -n;-n for player 2, but all that player 1 (respectively player 2) learns before starting stage n + 1 is u n (resp. v n ). Players are assumed to have perfect recall, and the whole description of the game is public knowledge.
For all-in I and-in J , denote by M-;-and R-;-the respective marginals of Q-;-on U and V . Because the players remember their own moves, we can include them in the signals and assume without loss of generality that for all-,-in I and-,-in J :
(-=-⇒ Supp M-;-∩ Supp M-;-= ∅) and (-=-⇒ Supp R-;-∩ Supp R-;-= ∅):
A behavior strategy of player 1 is an element = ( k ) k∈K , where for any k in K, k = ( k n ) n≥1 and k n is a mapping from the Cartesian product U n−1 (U 0 stands for a singleton) to (I ), giving the lottery on actions to be played by player 1 at stage n when the state is k, depending on the previous signals received. Because player 2 does not know the state, a behavior strategy is an element = ( n ) n≥1 where n is a mapping from the Cartesian product V n−1 to (J ), giving the lottery on actions to be played by player 2 at stage n. The sets of behavior strategies of players 1 and 2 are denoted by and T, respectively.
A (behavior) strategy proÿle ( ; ) induces, for every state k and stage N ¿0, a probability distribution over the set of the ÿrst N actions (I × J ) N . Also, ( ; ) and p 0 induce a probability over K × (I × J ) N . We can thus deÿne the average expected payo s (with the tilde denoting random variables):
We assume that players only consider the expectation of their (stage-)average payo s, and we use the following notion of equilibrium. DEFINITION 2.1. ( ; ) is a uniform equilibrium when: (i) ∀k ∈ K; ( k N ( ; )) N ≥1 converges as N goes to inÿnity to some k ( ; ), and (ÿ N ( ; )) N ≥1 converges as N goes to inÿnity to some ÿ( ; ).
(ii) For all ¿0, there exists a positive integer N 0 such that for all N ≥ N 0 ; ( ; ) is an -Nash equilibrium in the ÿnitely repeated game with N stages, i.e., N ( ; ) ≤ N ( ; ) + ; ∀ ∈ and ÿ N ( ; ) ≤ ÿ N ( ; ) + ; ∀ ∈ T. As has been noted earlier, we are going to prove the following: THEOREM 2.2.
∞ (p 0 ) has a uniform equilibrium.
If S is a ÿnite set, (S) will be viewed as {z = (z(s)) s∈S ∈ R S ; ∀s ∈ S; z(s) ≥ 0 and s∈S z(s) = 1}. If x = (x(-))-∈I ∈ R I ; y = (y(-))-∈J ∈ R J and C = (C-;-) (-;-)∈I ×J is an |I | × |J | matrix of reals, xCy will denote (-;-)∈I × J x(-)C-;-y(-).
We assume from now on, without loss of generality, that Suppp 0 = K. We ÿrst need some results from zero-sum games.
If at some stage player 1 plays according to x in (I ) and player 2 plays-in J , the probability distribution of the signal received by player 2 is -∈I x(-)R-;-. Denote for x in (I ); xR = ( -∈I x(-)R-;-)-∈J ∈ ( (V )) J and deÿne:
x ∈ NR and player 1 chooses to play, in each state k, according to x k , then player 2, whatever he does, will receive no information about the true state of nature: NR is the (nonempty compact convex) set of nonrevealing strategies (see Aumann and Maschler 1995) . If x ∈ NR, let xR be x k R for any k, and for x in (I ), deÿne x ∼ x if xR = x R. Now set, for every p in (K); x in NR, and y in (J ):
Deÿne also u(p) as the value of the zero-sum one-shot game in which player 1's strategy set is NR, player 2's strategy set is (J ), and the payo of player 1 is given by f p . Let cav u be the (pointwise) smallest concave function g from (K) to R, such that g(p) ≥ u(p) ∀p ∈ (K). Note that u and cav u are Lipschitz (with constant Zamir 1992 or Kohlberg 1975 .
For zero-sum games (i.e., B k = − A k ∀k ∈ K), Aumann and Maschler proved that the value of ∞ (p 0 ) exists and equals cav u(p 0 ). Kohlberg constructed an optimal strategy for the uninformed player (generalized to random signals; see Mertens et al. 1994, Part B, Chapter V.3.d ) that notably gives in our context: when ' = (' 1 ; : : : ; ' |K| ) in R K is such that ' · q ≥ u(q) ∀q ∈ (K) (where · denotes the canonical scalar product of R K ), there exists some strategy of player 2 such that:
3. A best-response joint plan. The notion of joint plan has been introduced by Aumann et al. (1995) . In our context of imperfect monitoring, it becomes: DEFINITION 3.1. A joint plan is a triple (S; ; ) in which:
• S is a nonempty ÿnite set (of "messages"), • = ( k ) k∈K ("signalling strategy"), where for each k; k ∈ (S) and ∀s ∈ S s = def simultaneously (with the same t for both players). The game is then "not far" from being a repeated game with complete information and imperfect monitoring, with payo s given by A k for player 1 and g ps for player 2. Player 2 will punish player 1 if, for some t in T s , the signals player 2 receives are "too di erent" from the ones player 2 expects to receive when player 1 plays x t; k s for some k. Given a joint plan (S; ; ), we deÿne: 
). Both (ii) and (iii) are individual rationality conditions. As for zero-sum games, it is possible not to use player 1's structure of signals. We then act as if player 1 were "blind" (i.e., his observation is trivial: ∀-∈ I;-;-∈ J M-;-= M-;-) and assume that player 2, who cannot be punished, plays best responses, according to his knowledge, to the actions taken by player 1. This last condition gives its name to the present joint plan, as opposed to that used in Sorin and in Simon et al., in which the uninformed player uses optimal strategies in the underlying zero-sum game.
Suppose that player 2's observation is trivial, that is, ∀-;-∈ I;-∈ J; R-;-= R-;-. Then NR = (I ) K . The strategic problem vanishes because the informed player does not fear revealing some information and can just concentrate on his stage payo s. Let (x; y) be a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game with normal form ( (I ) K ; (J ); f p0 ; g p0 ); then we have ∀k ∈ K; x k A k y ≥ x A k y ∀x ∈ (I ). Assume that in ∞ (p 0 ) the informed player plays at every stage x k if the true state is k and the uninformed player always plays y. This is clearly a (uniform) equilibrium. From now on, we thus assume that the observation of player 2 is not trivial. 4. Existence of a * BR joint plan. This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3.3. The idea is to consider, for each probability p on K, candidates for being player 1's payo ' if there is a * BR joint plan with p as a posterior probability. This gives some correspondence from (K) to R K which, after some approximation, can be considered as lower and upper semicontinuous. Then the approach of Simon et al. gives the conclusion.
When S is ÿnite and
, convC, intC, clC, and @C, respectively, denote the convex hull, the interior, the closure, and the frontier of C in [ (K)] .
Deÿne the correspondence:
and ∀k ∈ K; x k A k y = max{zA k y; z ∈ (I ) st: z ∼ x}}:
PROOF. (i)
To show that the graph of 1 (= {(p; (x; y)); p ∈ (K); (x; y) ∈ 1 (p)}) is compact, suppose (p n ; x n ; y n ) → n→∞ (p; x; y) with ∀n; (x n ; y n ) ∈ 1 (p n ). Then (p; x; y) belongs to the compact (K) × NR × (J ) and, because ((p; x; y) → g p (x; y)) is continuous, y is a best response against x for g p .
Fix k in K, and let z in (I ) be such that z ∼ x and zA k y = max{z A k y; z ∼ x}. For ¿0, let n 0 be such that n ≥ n 0 implies x k n −x k ≤ ; y n −y ≤ , and
We obtain (x; y) ∈ 1 (p). The graph of 1 is closed in the compact (K) × (I ) K × (J ), and, hence, is compact.
(ii) Let (p; q) be in (K) × int (K). Any Nash equilibrium (x; y) of the game with normal form (NR; (J ); f q ; g p ) is in 1 (p) and satisÿes f q (x; y) ≥ u(q).
If q belongs to (K), the compactness of 1 (p) and the continuity of ((q; x; y) → f q (x; y) − u(q)) gives the result.
Deÿne now 2 :
Elements in 2 (p) are candidates for being player 1's payo if there is a * BR joint plan with p as an a posteriori. We easily have:
• 2 has nonempty convex compact values and a compact graph.
Suppose now that we ÿnd a positive integer S, vectors p 1 ; : : : ; p S in (K), and vectors '; ' 1 ; : : : ; ' S in R K such that: • p 0 ∈ conv{p 1 ; : : : ; p S } (p 0 = S s=1 s p s , with s ¿0 ∀s and with the last equality derived from the fact that p 0 ∈ int (K) ∩ conv{p 1 ; : : : ; p S }. This joint plan is then a * BR joint plan. To prove Theorem 3.3, we look for such elements (p s ) s∈{1; :::; S} ; (' s ) s∈{1; :::; S} . To conclude this section, it is thus su cient to prove the following:
is a correspondence with compact graph and nonempty convex values; and
Then; given p 0 ∈ int( (K)); there exists a positive integer S; p 1 ; : : : ; p S ∈ (K); '; ' 1 ; : : : ; ' S ∈ R K such that:
• ∀s ∈ {1; : : : ; S}; ' s ∈ (p s );
• ∀s ∈ {1; : : :
The proof of Proposition 4.2 is as follows: we ÿrst see that it is su cient to prove it in the speciÿc case in which, in addition, u is piecewise-linear and is lower semicontinuous (lsc); in this case, the result is a consequence of the proof of Simon et al. (1995) . REMARK. A result very similar to Proposition 4.2 can be found in a preprint by R. Simon (1997) and is used to ÿnd necessary conditions for the existence of "good" equilibrium payo s in the full monitoring case. The approximation part of the proof is very di erent, and each proof can be used to prove each result.
PROOF.
(1) We show that it su ces to prove Proposition 4.2 in the speciÿc case in which u is piecewise-linear and is, moreover, lsc. Fix ¿0. We can construct "piecewise-linear" approximations of u and as follows.
Consider a (ÿnite) subdivision S of (K) such that the diameter of any simplex of S is smaller than and Á (we can, for example, iterate the process of barycentric subdivision of (K); see, for example, Spanier 1966) . For each simplex X of S, denote by V (X ) the set of vertices of X .
Similarly, deÿne : (K) → R K by its graph:
In other words, when q ∈ X with q = p∈V (X ) p p; ∀p p ≥ 0 and
Then we easily can see that • has nonempty convex values.
• Graph is compact as a ÿnite union of convex hulls of compacta in an Euclidean space.
We only prove the last point. Fix p and q in (K). Write p = p ∈V (X ) p p with p in X; p ≥ 0 for all p , and p ∈V (X ) p = 1. By assumption, for any
Moreover, is also lsc. This property can be formally shown as follows. Let q be in (K); ' be in (q), and X be the smallest simplex of S containing q. We have V (X ) = {p 1 ; : : : ; p F } for some F in {1; : : : ; |K|} and q = f∈{1; :::; F} f p f (with ∀f; f ¿0 and f∈{1; :::; F} f = 1). Put F+1 = F+2 = : : : = |K| = 0.
There exists Á ¿0 such that ∀q ∈ (K); q−q ≤ Á implies that there exists a simplex Y of S containing both q and q (and, therefore, containing X ).
Considering that, for any simplex Y of dimension |K| − 1 containing X (with V (Y ) = {p 1 ; : : : ; p |K| }), the norm of the inverse of the linear functional from R |K|−1 to {r ∈ R K ; k∈K r k = 0} which associates to some vector ( 2 ; : : : ; |K| ) the quantity
, we get the existence of some ÿxed such that for all Á ≤ Á ; q − q ≤ Á implies that:
• There exists Y in S with dimension |K|−1, such that Y contains q and q (put
, with ' f arbitrarily chosen in (p f ) for f¿F. Then '−' ≤ |K| Á max f∈{1; :::; |K|} ' f . With the graph of compact, p∈ (K) (p) is compact and thus is bounded in norm by some ÿxed M ¿0.
We then obtain:
We will also need the following easily obtainable result, using the upper semicontinuity of :
CLAIM. If n → n→∞ 0; q n → n→∞ q in (K), and
) is an open subset of R K containing (q); so, by upper semicontinuity of at q, U is an open subset of (K) containing q. Thus there exists n 0 such that for n ≥ n 0 ; q n + cl B(0; n ) ⊂ U . Then for n ≥ n 0 ; ' n is a convex combination of elements in (q) + B(0; ) and, hence, is in (q) + B(0; ). Because (q) is closed, it contains '.
Suppose now that Proposition 4.2 is proved for u piecewise linear and lsc, and let u and satisfy the hypothesis of the proposition. Fix p 0 in int( (K)). Then, for any n¿0, setting n = 1=n and applying the result for u n and n gives the existence of some S n ; p n 1 ; : : : ; p n S n ; ' n 1 ; : : : ; ' n S n ; ' n . By Caratheodory's theorem, one can always take S n = |K|. For any s we have ' n s ≤ M and, because p 0 ∈ int( (K)); ' n ≤ M . Taking limits of convergent subsequences then gives, according to the previous claim, the desired result.
(2) Now we must prove the proposition for u piecewise-linear and lsc. As has been said earlier, this is a consequence of the work of Simon et al. Here we adapt and rewrite a part of their proof: Some little game theoretical consideration is introduced; we only keep the arguments necessary to solve our problem; and we apply their celebrated topological result in a simple form.
Denote
, consider the zero-sum game G l with normal form ( (K); (r(l)); ) where (q; ') = cav u(q) − ':q − w(l) : q for q in (K) and ' in (r(l)). The strategy's sets are compact convex, and by Sion's theorem (see, for example, Mertens et al. 1994 , Part A, Chapter I), G l has a value, denoted by z(l), and both players have optimal strategies. Because r; w, and are continuous (for , meaning usc and lsc), so is z.
We now consider the auxiliary correspondence:
Note that (l) = {'+w(l)+z(l)e; ' is optimal for the second player in G l }. By continuity and compactness, has a closed graph and nonempty compact convex values.
Taking S = 1; p 1 = p 0 and ' 1 = ' gives the result of the proposition.
From now on, we thus assume that z(p 0 )¿0. We are going to ÿnd some elements l 1 ; : : : ; l S in [ (K)] and ' ∈ E such that p 0 ∈ conv{r(l 1 ); : : : ; r(l S )} and for each s in {1; : : : ; S}; ' ∈ (l s ) and z(l s ) = 0. Setting p s = r(l s ) and ' s = ' − w(l s ) for each s will then ÿnish the proof.
The approximation of the original u as a piecewise-linear mapping was motivated by the next lemma. Letting Q be the convex polytope {(q; t) ∈ (K) × R; t ≤ cav u(q)} and V = {q ∈ (K); (q; cav u(q)) is a vertex of Q}. V is ÿnite and for all q in V; cav u(q) = u(q).
PROOF. Let l in [ (K)] be such that z(l)¿0;' be in (l), andq be optimal for the ÿrst player in G l . Because' is in E, we have cav u(q) ≤':q.' ∈ (l) also gives ':q ≤ max '∈ (r(l)) ':q + w(l):q + z(l), and becauseq is optimal in G l , this last quantity is cav u(q ). So,':q = cav u(q ) and max '∈ (r(l)) ':q¡cav u(q ). Because by assumption max '∈ (r(l)) ':q ≥ u(q ), we get cav u(q)¿u(q).
Consider now the smallest face of Q containing (q; cav u(q )). If q 1 ; : : : ; q T are its vertices, we have T ≥ 2;q = T t=1 Á t q t and cav u(q ) = T t=1 Á t u(q t ) for some positive Á 1 ; : : : ; Á T such that T t=1 Á t = 1. Because':q = cav u(q) and' ∈ E;':q t = u(q t ) for all t. Now ÿx R¿0 large enough: R¿4M |K| + 1. For any integer n such that z(p 0 )¿1=n, put O n = {l ∈ [ (K)]; l ¡R and z(l)¿1=n} and denote by |cl(On) the restriction of the correspondence to the closure of O n . O n contains p 0 , and because z is continuous, is an open subset of the Euclidean space [ (K)], which has dimension |K| − 1. |cl(On) has a compact graph and nonempty compact convex values; moreover, l∈cl(On) (l) ⊂ q1; q2∈V; q1 =q2 {' ∈ R k ; ':q 1 = u(q 1 ); ':q 2 = u(q 2 )} and, hence, has dimension lower than |K| − 2. We now apply the following simpliÿed version of a topological result proved in THEOREM (SIMON, SPIEŻ, AND TORU Ã NCZYK). Let C be a compact of a m-dimensional Euclidean space and x 0 ∈ int C. Let Y be a metric compact space. Let F be a correspondence from C to Y with a closed graph and nonempty contractible values such that F(C)\F(@C) has dimension at most m − 1.
Let D → co(D) be an operation deÿned for all compacta D of C such that:
(1) ∀D; co(D) is contractible; compact; and contains D.
Then there exists L ⊂ @C; y 0 ∈ Y such that ∀l ∈ L; y 0 ∈ F(l) and x 0 ∈ co(L).
Note that D → conv D satisÿes these assumptions. Applying the theorem for C = cl(O n );
is not possible for l n = ∈ (K) (because then r(l n ) ∈ @ (K)). We actually have p 0 ∈ conv(r(L n )) and can choose L n with cardinal number |K| using Caratheodory's theorem. Note also that ' n belongs to the compact {l∈[ (K)]; l ≤R} (l) and because O n ⊂ int(cl(O n )), we have for each l n in L n ; l n = R or z(l n ) = 1=n. Now let n go to inÿnity. Choosing converging subsequences gives the existence of
To show this last point, suppose that there exists l in L such that l (= max{|l 1 |; : : : ; |l |K| |}) = R. When R = max{l 1 ; : : : ; l |K| }, one can ÿnd some k in K such that l k ≤ (1 − R)=(|K| − 1) ¡0. Because −R¡(1 − R)=(|K| − 1); R = max{−l 1 ; : : : ; −l |K| } also gives the existence of some k in K such that l k ≤ (1 − R)=(|K| − 1). We then have, in all cases, some k in
, which is impossible by deÿnition of R.
We then have z(l) = 0 for all l in L. As has been shown earlier, deÿning p l = r(l) and ' l = ' − w(l) for all l in L ends the proof of Proposition 4.2 and, consequently, of Theorem 3.3.
The existence of a * BR joint plan being proven, we now have to show that its payo s are equilibrium payo s.
From
* BR joint plan to equilibrium. This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3.4. We start with a * BR joint plan. Keeping all the notations of §3, we have the following data:
• Although the notations are numerous, the idea of the equilibrium strategies is quite simple. As has been noted for general joint plans, player 1 observes the true state k, then chooses s according to k and announces s to player 2 by playing some actions that player 2 can distinguish (using a code established in advance). With the frequency t s (for each t ∈ T s ), the players then play x t; k s and y t s , and player 2 will punish player 1 only if the signals he receives are "statistically di erent" from the ones he expects to receive if player 1 plays x t; k s for some k (recall that x t s is a nonrevealing strategy). Because ' is individually rational (i.e., satisÿes point (ii) of Deÿnition 3.2), it is possible to deÿne punishments that will push player 1's payo , in any state k, down to ' k . However, because player 1 might be punished without having deviated, he will never be punished forever but only for very long periods of time.
Why, then, will we get an equilibrium? If the true state is k, player 1's payo cannot exceed ' k , and this is what player 1 gets when he does not deviate, that is, when player 1 chooses s according to k and plays x t; k s with the appropriate frequencies (see condition (i) of Deÿnition 3.2). Once s has been chosen according to some k , the posterior probability of player 2 about the true state of nature is given by p s , and condition (iii) of Deÿnition 3.2 will ensure that this player is, at every stage, (almost) in best response against the average one-shot strategy of player 1 (who never uses his past observations).
To deÿne these strategies formally, we ÿrst deÿne, in Proposition 5.1, what to play once an s has been chosen. For this purpose, we mainly adapt the construction of strategies in repeated games with complete information and signals (from Lehrer 1990 Lehrer , 1992 . The game is played in blocks of increasing lengths B 1 ; : : : ; B m ; : : : ; and the play consists of a main path and punishment phases. While in the main path, at block B m the players will play so as to approach the contract s (see Deÿnition 3.1). At the end of the block, the uninformed player will compute the di erence between the frequency of signals observed and the frequency of signals expected to be observed. If this di erence is too large, player 2 will suspect player 1 of deviation, and will punish him during blocks B m+1 ; : : : ; B m 2 . After this punishment phase, and whatever happens, the play returns to the main path. Regarding the proof, the main di erences with Lehrer's work are the following: the signals are not assumed here to be deterministic; the punishments will not be "almost sure"; and, of course, player 2 does not know player 1's selected payo matrix.
To conclude the proof of Theorem 3.4, a last problem will have to be solved. Because signals may be random, player 1 might not be able to announce some message s with probability one within a ÿxed number of stages at the beginning of the play. In the equilibrium constructed, he will choose s once and for all with the appropriate probability distribution and then announce this message to player 2 during communication phases that last longer and longer but have no in uence on the payo s. PROPOSITION 5.1. For each s in S; there exists s = ( k s; n ) n≥1; k∈K in and s in T such that:
(1) While using s ;
• Player 1 does not use his past observations: ∀n ≥ 1; k ∈ K; k s; n is a constant function from U n−1 to (I ); • player 1 plays "nonrevealing": ∀n ≥ 1; ( 1 s; n (U n−1 ); : : : ; ( and then, whatever happens, will come back to the main path. Regarding punishments, the uninformed player will compare in block m theoretical frequencies and observations. Put, for any m¿0, t ∈ T s ,-∈ J , and v ∈ V : To deÿne the punishments, set for m ≥ 1: ÿ m = min{ ≥ 0; there exists a strategy ∈ T such that ∀ ∈ ; k ∈ K and N ∈ {(m + 1) 10 ; (m + 1) 10 + 1; : : : ; m 20 };
Because ' is individually rational, the zero-sum game result stated in §2 implies that (ÿ m ) m≥1 converges to zero. Let m be a strategy of player 2 that pushes player 1's payo down to ' + ÿ m in any game of length between (m + 1) 10 and m 20 . To punish player 1 at the blocks m + 1; : : : ; m 2 , player 2 will play at any block m ∈ {m + 1; : : : ; m 2 } according to the |B m | ÿrst moves of m .
s and s are now well deÿned and condition (1) of Proposition 5.1 is clearly satisÿed. To prove (2), we show in a standard way (see Lehrer 1990) , based on the use of Tchebychev's inequality, that when there is no deviation, with probability one player 1 will only be punished a ÿnite number of times. Regarding condition (3), the fact that player 2's payo cannot exceed s is just a consequence of point (iii) of Deÿnition 3.2. Condition (4) is more di cult to prove. Considering player 1's possible deviations in state k, we will ÿrst see that, for actions, payo s, and signals, we can think as if at large blocks player 1 was repeating independently some mixed actionx in (I ). Secondly, while using somex such that player 2's signal Rx is not far from that expected (meaning without any deviation), the best payo that player 1 can obtain cannot be much greater than the expected ' k . We then obtain that for large blocks, when player 2 is in the main path, player 1 cannot have a payo much greater than ' k without being punished afterwards. In conclusion, we will see that the punishing strategies of the uninformed player are e cient enough to prevent any deviation of player 1 from being proÿtable.
PROOF OF CONDITION (2). Suppose that player 1 plays k s and player 2 plays s . To prove (2), we will show that, with probability 1, player 1 will only be punished a ÿnite number of times and that, given that the main path is played, average expected payo s converge almost surely to the appropriate quantities. Consider block B m ; where player 2 is not punishing.
We ÿrst bound the probability that player 2 punishes player 1 at blocks m+1; : : : ; m 2 . Let t ∈ T s ,-∈ J , and v ∈ V be such that R-;-(v)¿0 for some-(and then, since we included the moves in the signals, R-;-(v) = 0 for all-in I and-=-, and {n ∈ B We then obtain that player 1 will be punished after block B m with probability at most (18|J | 2 |V |)=m 5 . We can now do the same for payo s at block m. For any-∈ I;-∈ J , and t ∈ T s , Tchebychev's inequality gives: 
Doing the same for player 2 gives that for m ≥ M 1 ,
Deÿne now the events:
B m = {player 2 is in the main path at block B m }:
According to Borel Cantelli lemma, limsup (B m ∩ B c m+1 ) (E c denoting the complementary of the event E) has probability zero. Because player 2 always comes back to the main path, with probability 1 there exists some blockm such that for m ≥m, B m holds. Because limsup(A m ∩ B m ) also has probability zero, P(limsup A m ) = 0. Because the cardinal of the B m is polynomial (in m), this ensures that almost surely.
Using the bounded convergence theorem, we ÿnally get Condition (2) of Proposition 5.1.
PROOF OF CONDITION (3). Assume that player 2 uses some in T. Because for every k in K, player 1, while playing k s , never uses past observations (including player 1's own moves), it is easy to see that at each stage n in block B t; m s :
and, thus, because y t s is a best response against x t s in g ps ; k∈K p k s E k s ; B k -n;-n ≤ g ps (x t s ; y t s ). Consequently, the best that player 2 can do is to maximize, at each stage, his stage payo .
Because for each t in T s ; 1=N
, we get condition (3). PROOF OF CONDITION (4). Finally, ÿx k in K and ¿0, and assume that player 2 plays according to s while player 1 uses some . Deÿne, for any m, the following random variable:
The proof of condition (4) is divided into two parts, A) and B). A) We ÿrst bound the probability that, at block B m while player 2 is in the main path, player 1 has a "good" payo but will not be punished afterwards. More precisely, we prove the following: LEMMA A. There exists a block number M such that for any m ≥ M;
PROOF OF LEMMA A. The proof is separated into two steps A1 and A2, in which we only consider blocks in the main path. In A1, we show that for payo s and signals, one can assume that at large blocks B t; m s , player 1 is repeating independently some mixed actioñ x t; m s in (I ). In A2, we conclude the proof of Lemma A by stating that, when player 1 repeatedly uses some mixed action, player 1 cannot obtain a payo much greater than ' k without being punished afterward.
Step A1. Consider block B m while player 2 is in the main path and ÿx t in To obtain (1 ) and (2 ), we need to prove several basic inequalities.
As before, the simple use of Tchebychev's inequality gives:
Now ÿx-in I and-in J and deÿne for each n in B t; m s the random variables: R n = 1 wheñ -n =-, R n = 0 when-n =-, Y n = 1 when-n =-, and Y n = 0 when-n =-. As in Lehrer's work, we apply the following lemma (see Lehrer 1992 , Appendix 1 for the proof).
LEMMA (LEHRER). Let R 1 ; : : : ; R n be a sequence of identically distributed Bernoulli random variables; with parameter p. Let Y 1 ; : : : ; Y n be a sequence of Bernoulli random variables, such that for each 1 ≤ m ≤ n; R m is independent of R 1 ; : : : ; R m−1 , Y 1 ; : : : ; Y m .
2 for every ¿0.
We then get, for all-and-:
Fix now-in J and v in V , such that R-;-(v)¿0 for some-in I . We will show that, with great probability, 1=|B t; m s ||{n ∈ B t; m s ; (-n ;ṽ n ) = (-; v)}| is not far from 1=|B t; m s | -∈I |{n ∈ B t; m s ; (-n ;-n ) = (-;-)}|R-;- (v) . Because the signals may be random, we cannot use again the previous lemma.
Let E be the set of possible sequences of moves played at block B t; m s (with an element in E viewed as a mapping from B t; m s to I × J ). Fix in E, denote by E the event (∀n ∈ B t; m s ; (-n ;-n ) = (n)), and let −1 ( j) be {n ∈ B t; m s ; (n) = (-;-) for some i in I }. For any-in I such that | −1 (-;-)|≥| −1 (-)|=m 2 , Tchebychev's inequality gives: P(| |{n ∈ B t; m s ; (-n ;-n ;ṽ n ) = (-;-;
So, given E , we have with probability at least 1 − |I |m Finally, the use of (6 ) yields the desired inequality (1 ):
This ends step A1 of the proof of Lemma A.
Step A2. We still consider a block B m where player 2 is in the main path. That player 1 only has a small probability to obtain a good payo without being punished afterward is now easy to get. Suppose that, for some t in T s , player 2 does not consider that a deviation has occurred at block B Denoting by R( (I )) the compact set {xR; x ∈ (I )} ⊂ (V ) J , the mapping (X ∈ R( (I )) → max{x A k y t s ; x ∈ (I ); x R = X }) is clearly upper semicontinuous (it is indeed continuous; see the proof of Lemma 4.1). We can thus deÿne the following t; k s (m), which goes to zero as m goes to inÿnity:
The convergence of 
Summing up, we ÿnd E(1=N
Because this is true for su ciently large N for all strategies of player 1, this ÿnishes the proof of Condition (4) of Proposition 5.1 and, hence, the proof of the proposition.
We can now construct a uniform equilibrium ( * ; * ) in ∞ (p 0 ), proving Theorem 3.4. As noted at the beginning of §5, the last problem, because of the consideration of random signalling, is that player 1 might not be able to announce perfectly some a message s within a ÿxed number of stages. Hence, the play will be divided into consecutive blocks of increasing lengths C 1 ; : : : ; C m ; : : : . First, player 1 learns k and chooses once and for all a message s, according to the distribution k . At the beginning of each block C m , player 1 tries to announce s to player 2. After this announcement phase, player 2 will infer from the signals he received in this phase a messages m . In the last part of C m , players 1 and 2, respectively, will play according to the ÿrst moves of k s and sm given by Proposition 5.1. Then the play goes to C m+1 , and for simplicity both players no longer use the signals they received at previous blocks (the uniform equilibrium constructed will consequently have some robustness in the spirit of subgame or Bayesian perfection). Note that the uninformed player is never punishing player 1 during the announcement phases. Consequently, if at some block C m player 2 simply misinterprets the (honest) message announced by player 1 and then punishes player 1 for a very long period, player 2 has another chance to infer the correct message at the beginning of C m+1 .
To deÿne the strategies formally, we ÿrst specify a code allowing the informed player to announce messages. Because we supposed that the observation of player 2 is not trivial, max{|R-;-(v) − R-;-(v)|;-;-∈ I;-∈ J; v ∈ V }¿0. Denoting by c this maximum, let-;-in I;-in J , andv in V be such that c = R-;-(v) − R-;-(v). Consider some integer d and an injection f from S to the product {-;-} d . When s belongs to S, f(s) will be denoted by The strategy * of player 1 will be deÿned as a mixture of behavior strategies: once player 1 knows the state, player 1 chooses a behavior strategy with some lottery. Because we assumed perfect recall, Kuhn's theorem allows us to view * also as a "regular" behavior strategy.
When the true state is k; * k is deÿned as follows: • Choose s in S once and for all with probability p Looking at the length of the blocks, it follows that Bkn ;-n =m 2 ) ≤ + ∀ ∈ T. Looking again at the length of the blocks, one can conclude and show that Condition ii) of deÿnition 2.1 is also satisÿed. Thus, ( * ; * ) is a uniform equilibrium.
6. Concluding remarks. For two-player undiscounted repeated games with incomplete information, an example from Sorin and Zamir (1985) shows that equilibria may fail to exist (even for zero-sum games) in the case of lack of information on "one and a half sides," when player 1 knows the selected payo matrices but does not know what player 2 has learned about the state. In the model studied here, when player 1 knows player 2's initial knowledge of the state, the existence of the value and optimal strategies for zerosum games is a well-known fact. Our work generalizes this result to the non zero-sum case and shows that the condition that one player knows at every stage the a posteriori probability of the other player is not necessary to ensure the existence of equilibria.
In fact, our proof uses player 1's ability to control, by playing the same action on large blocks of stages, the a posteriori probability of the uninformed player. Roughly speaking, the important information that player 2 gets is what player 1 gives to him. This can also work for a more general model of observation (which was already treated in the zero-sum case; see Mertens et al. for a construction of optimal strategies in the random signalling case) in which the signalling matrix may depend moreover on the state of nature. More precisely, we think that analogues to § §3 and 5 can be done without too many di culties, whereas the generalization of §4 would be more di cult to obtain, because in this case the set of nonrevealing strategies may depend on the a posteriori probability of the uninformed player and can be empty for some values of this variable.
